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Suminary findings
The Venezuelan government and PDVSA  (Venezuela's  For products, the liquidity is concentrated  in the nearest
state oil companies) are both exposed to oil price  4-5  months. So, for short-term hedges (6-9 months
instability. Given the existing tax structure, PDVSA Las a  ahead), there is sufficient liquidity for Venezuela to
higher exposure than the government, especially when  hedge a substantial part of its exports. For longer-terni
prices drop below $18-20  a barrel.  hedges, the over-the-counter market is the more
Claessens and Varangis show that the volatility of  appropriate vehicle. In either case, it will not usually be
prices for crude oil is higher (but not significantly) than  the case that all production  or exports should be hedge
the volatility of prices for refined oil products. And both  Claessens and Varangis also e- amined the issue of an
prices are highly correlated.  So, there is not much  oil stabilization fund. For an oil stabilization fund to be
strength to the argument that Venezuela, being now  effective, several preconditions  must be met. Most
mainly an exporter  of refinca products,  faces less  notably: oil prices should not follow a random walk;
volatility than when it was exporting m-'nly crude oil  financial markets are incomplete; and there are large
The basis risk for hedging Venezuelan crude oil was  adjustment costs. These conditions do likely apply in
found to be higher than for other crudes of comparable  Venezuela.
quality in the region. One explanation could be the  Venezuela's best strategy would be to remove as much
pricing policies Venezuela follows, which leads  short-term oil price risk as possible by using short-dated
Venezuelan crude oil prices to deviate for long periods  hedging instruments (such as futures, options, or shott-
from international prices. The basis risk in Venezuelan  dated swaps) and to also do some longer term hedging
refined products is much lower and at acceptable levels  (using mainly over-the-counter  options and long-dated
for doing risk management.  swaps). They also find that an oil stabilization fund
The issue of liquidity in the hedging markets is crucial,  should be complemented by using market-based risk
as Venezuela is a major oil producer. Oil futures and  management tools. The oil stabilization fund could then
options markets are liquid, but the liquidity is  be used to ma  Age  any remaining interperiod oil price
concentrated in contracts for periods of less than a year.  risk to the extent considered necessary.
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Both the Venezuelan  government  and PDVSA--Venezuela's  state  oil companies--are  quite
exposed to oil price instability.  Given the existing oil tax structure, PDVSA has a higher
exposure than the government,  particularly  when prices are below $18-20 per barrel.
Our analysis shows  that the volatility  of crude oil prices is higher, but not significantly,
than the volatility  of refined oil product  prices and both prices are highly correlated. Thus the
argument  that  Venezuela,  being now  mainly  a refined  products  exporter, faces  less volatility  than
when it was exporting mainly crude oil is not very strong.
The basis risk for hedging Venezuelan  crude oil was found to be higher than for other
crudes of comoarable quality in the region.  One explanation could be the pricing policies
followed  by Venezuela. The basis risk in Venezuelan  prodicts is much lower and at acceptable
levels for doing risk management.
The issue of liquidity in the hedging markets is crucial as Venezuela is a large oil
producer.  Oil futures/options  markets are liquid but the liquidity is concentrated  in contracts
with a period of less than year.  For products, the liquidity is concentrated  in the nearest 4-5
months.  Thus, for short-term hedges (six-nine months ahead) there is sufficient liquidity for
Venezuela  to hedge a substantial  part of its exports.  For longer-term  hedges, the over-the-
counter market is the rnore appropriate avenue to use.  In either case it will not usually be the
case that all production or exports should  be hedged.
We also examined the issue of an oil stabilization  fund (OSF).  For an OSF to be
effective, several pre-conditions need to be met; some of these are not met in the case of
Venezuela. The most notable conditions which do not exist are the absence of a random  walk
in oil prices, incompleteness  of financial  markets, and the existence  of large adjustment  costs.'
We conclude  that the best strategy for Venezuela  to follow is to remove as much short-
term  oil price  risk  as possible through use of  short-dated hedging instruments (such as
futures/options/short-dated  swaps) as well as to do some longer-term  hedging (using mainly
over-the-counter options and  long-dated swaps).  We  also  find that  an OSF  should be
complemented  by the use of market-based  risk management  tools.  The OSF could then be used
to manage  any remaining interperiod  oil price risk to the extent considered necessary.
'Incompleteness  of financial  markets means  that not every contigency  (time, type) is covered
by a financial  contract.1.  INSTRODUC  TION 2
Much of Venezuela's economic  management  during  the last two decades has focussed  on
how to accommodate to changes in the international  oil market.  The particular choice of
economic  policy instruments  and institutional  practices has resulted in the poor management  of
oil resources  with flow-on  effects  to the economy,  reflected  in the high variability  of savings  and
investments  (Edwards, 1992).
In 1992, Venezuela  received  about 80% of its merchandise  export revenues  and 80% of
government  revenues from oil-related  activities. This dependence  on oil exports has to a large
extent  determined  the economic  policies  implemented  in Venezuela. Forecasts  of oil prices are
crucial in projecting  fiscal revenues in preparing the government  budget  each year.  Under the
current system, the budget office depends on the oil company, PDVSA, for forecasts of oil
prices and other relevant  data, such as production  and export volumes. Under  the taxation  rules
variations of projected tax payment are settled at the end of the year. 3 Export volumes are
much less uncertain  and more stable than prices.  Daily developments  in the oil market directly
influence  the fiscal agencies' expenditure  commitments. Politically  stronger ministers  usually
find it easier than others to commit funds beyond their original budget when oil prices seem
high. This makes it difficult  to control public  expenditures  even after the budget  has been voted
2The authors wish to thank Ron Duncan, Mayra Zermeno, Ramon  Espinasa, and Mudassar
Imran for valuable  comments.
3Income  taxes are paid by PDVSA  each quarter based on oil price projections  made at the
b&  ginning  of the year for each quarter.  At the end of the year, a reconciliation  using the actual
year's  price  determines whether PDVSA makes additional income tax  payments to  the
government. During the period 1980-89,  predicted  oil export revenues were about 7% lower
than actual oil export revenues.2
by Congress. On the monetary  side, monetization  of the oil revenues,  in the absence  of effective
domestic sterilization  instruments,  is a major source of (price) instability.
The issue of oil price uncertainty  and its effects on the Venezuelan  economy has been
studied extensively.  Noteworthy studies are those of  asmann and of Powell (1990) and
Hausmann et  al.  (1991) which describe the main concerns and the costs imposed on the
Venezuelan  economy  due to the necessary  adjustments. In the Hausmann  etLaL  (1991) study,
a  stabilization fund is proposed to  "smooth-out" the effects of oil price  volatility on  the
Venezuelan  economy. A stabilization  fund along these lines is currently  under consideration  by
the Venezuelan  government.
What has yet  to  be examined for Venezuela is the  possibility of  using financial
instruments  to "smooth  out" oil price volatility. These instruments  can be substitutes  for an oil
stabilization  fund (OSF)  or, as we shall see later in the paper, could complement  it.  Experience
with commodity  stabilization  funds  (CSFs) has shown  that few have  worked well  and many  have
failed. This is to be expected  because of the time series properties of commodity  prices. Price
swings are too large, too long-lived  and too uncertain  to be smoothed  by any reasonably-sized
CSF.  The necessary accumulation  of reserves during booms has to be very large, and is
therefore very expensive and,  most probably, politically unacceptable.  Correspondingly,
drawings from the fund in times of price slumps tend to be very large and with uncertain  dates
of replenishment  (Deaton, 1992).3
Finarcial instruments  can achieve  efficient hedgng of oil price exposures  and may hold
the following  advantages  over non-market  schemes (such as a stabilization  fund):  1) they are
more efficient, because they are more economical  in using monetary and physical resources; 2)
they are able to shift price risk externally; 3) they  provide longer term price assurance;  4) they
provide market-based expectations  of future prices; and 5) they are less likely to introduce
economic  distortions because  they are market-based.
Because they are in principle more efficient, financial instruments  could provide an
attractive alternative to an OSF in the case of Venezuela.  To date, Venczuela has not used
financial  risk management  instruments  on any significant  scale.  Some reasons put forward as
to why  Venezuela  has not used financial  instruments  for hedging  purposes  are: first, PDVSA  has
diversified  its export basket from mainly  selling  crude oil to mainly selling  refined  products  and,
as a result, it faces less volatility as product prices are less volatile than crude oil prices.
Second, because of quality differences  and the pricing policies pursued, the basis risk between
futures prices and Venezuelan  spot crude oil prices is high.  Third, there is too little liquidity
in international  financial  markets given the size of Venezuela's oil exports.  Fourth, financial
instruments  are assumed  to be costly. Finally, there is the question  of who should be using the
financial  instruments  for hedging purposes:  the government  or PDVSA? These issues, as well
as further discussion on an OSF and how market-based  financial  instruments  can complement
an OSF, are analyzed  in detail in this paper. In general, we find little support  for the arguments
made as to why financial  instruments  cannot  be used effectively. We conclude  that market-based
risk management  tools could and should  be used by Venezuela.4
The structure  of the paper is as follows:  Section  2 analyzes  the allocation  of oil price risk
within  Venezuela. Section  3 analyzes  in detail the claims that petroleum  product  prices are less
volatile  than crude oil, that products  offer price diversification,  and that the basis risk is too high
and there is too little liquidity  in the oil derivatives  markets.  Section  4 analyses the necessary
requirements  for the establishment  of an OSF, and the rules under which an OSF, if deemed
necessary, should operate.  The section also outlines how an OSF can be complemented  with
financial  instruments. Section  5 discusses  the institutional  arrangements  for hedging  and section
6 presents the conclusions.5
2.  ALLOCATION  OF OIL PRICE RISK IN VENEZUELA:  GOVERNMENT  AND PDVSA
In recent years, the petroleum  sector has accounted  for about 23% of GDP; howtver,
inclusion  of its indirect contributions  (spillover effects to other sectors) brings its share up to
two-thirds  of the GDP.  Between  1982 and 1988 oil-related  revenues (mainly  PDVSA's taxes
and royalties) accounted  for an average of 67.3% of total government  revenues.  In 1991 the
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government  of Venezuela (GOV) to oil prices.  Figure 1 shows the high correlation between
GOV's oil fiscal revenues and petroleum  prices. 4 Regression  analysis for the period 1970-91
finds that about 94% of the volatijity in the GOV's oil fiscal revenues can be attributed to
volatility in oil prices.  Also, oil price volatility  explains about 74% of the volatility in total
government  revenues. 5 Furthermore, a 10% change in oil prices  trans!ates  into a 7% change
in the GOV's oil fiscal revenues.  In terms of total government  revenues (oil and non-oil), a
10% cOiange  in oil prices brings about a 6.1% change in total government  revenues.
The two main items contributing to the GOV's oil fiscal revenues (and total GOV
reveinues)  are income taxes and royalties paid by PDVSA.  The income tax is calculated as
follows. (a) the oil export revenue is multiplied  by a factor of 1.2 and to that domestic  sales are
added to arrive at gross sales  (b) from the gross sales are deducted: operating  costs (including
depreciation),  the so called legal contribution  (aporte legal), royalty payments, and 10% of the
gross profits before taxes; (c) the remainder, (a) minus the reductions in (b), is taxed at a rate
of 67%.  Proceeds from PDVSA's income taxes accounted  for 59% (,f GOV's total reveinues
and 74% of GOV's oil tax revenues in 1991.
In addition, in 1991  royalties accounted  for about 20% of GOV's revenues and 26% of
GOV's oil tax revenues. Taken  together, the royalty  and the incomue  tax account  for a little over
4GOV oil fiscal revenues is the sum of oil tax revenues and royalties.
5Over the period 1974-91  the volatility  of total government  revenues was estimated to be
27.6%, while that of oil-related revenues was 28.3%.  The volatility of govermnent  revenues
is thus significant. Such volatility  makes the carrying through  of government  plans extremely
difficult. Volatility  is defined as the standard  deviation  of the relevant  variable  in first difference
form.7
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80% of revenues from PDVSA. The royalty is one-sixth  of the gross oil revenue which is the
product  of total production  times world oil prices.  According  to this formula, royalty  revenues
should closely correlate with world oil prices.  Statistical analysis showed that they do not.
Figure 2 plots royalties  and world oil prices, showing  royalties  not to be responsive  to world oil
price changes, particularly  during the period 1977-85.  For most of the years during the period
1971-91  the percentage changes in royalties have been below the percentage changes in world
oil prices.  Regression analysis also showed that world oil prices explain only 23% of the
volatility  in royalties  and that a 10%  change in world oil prices is translated  into a 3.6% change8
in rcyalties.  Thus, histoAcally, royalties have not been very responsive to worid oil price
changes.  One reason could be that the  oil price used to  calculate the  royalty has been
determined  with soine discretion  by the Ministry of Energy and Mines.
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Figure 3a shows the sensitivity  of gross oil export revenues, GOV's oil fiscal revenues,
and PDVSA's after tax profits per barrel to different  levels of the oil price. 6 At low prices, the
sensitivity of  GOV's oil tax  returns is much lower--about 13 percentage points--than the
sensitivity  of PDVSA's after tax profits per barrel  This is because a; low oil prices the
percentage  of the royalty--which  is not very responsive  to oil prices--in  the GOV's oil
fiscal revenues is high. 7 As prices increase and the share of royalty payments  in total oil tax
revenues drops, the sensitivity of GOV oil fiscal revenues to oil prices is close to that of
PDVSA's. Particularly  in the case of a low price, royalty payments  provide a kind of hedge for
the GOV as payments  are not very sensitive  to oil price changes. If royalty payments  become
more srnsitive to oil prices, PDVSA's exposure  becomes  somewhat  closer to the government's
exposure. 3 Even then, PDVSA  has a higher exposure than the government  because of the role
of production  costs. PDVSA incurs costs of production that we assumed  to be fixed at any oil
price level.  That is, PDVSA is incurring the same cost of production whether oil prices are
US$15 per barrel or US$30 per barrel.  Thus, at low oil prices the percentage of costs in
PDVSA's gross revenues is high, causing PDVSA's after tax profit per barrel to be more
sensitive  at low world oil prices.
6Sensitivity  refers to the percentage charge in the total dollar amounts of PDVSA's net
income, government revenues and gross oil revenues following a $1 oil price change.  The
results are based on  he current tax regime.
'Based on the regression  analysis for the period 1971-91, we assumed  that a 10% change
in oil prices corresponds  to a 3.6% change in royalties.
81f  royalties responded  completely  to world oil price movements, at low world prices the
difference  in the sensitivity  between  the GOV's oil fiscal revenues  and PDVSA's  after-tax  profits
drops from about 13% to about 8%.10
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Figure (3b)  compares  PDVSA's  after tax revenues  per barrel exposure  with government's
oil fiscal revenue  exposure. In this case PDVSA'  s after tax revenues  (total  revenues  minus  taxes
and royalties) exposure is less than the government's oil fiscal revenue exposure.  Sensitivity
analysis  showed  that PDVSA's after-tax revenues are about 7% less sensitive  to changes in oil
prices than the governiment's  oil fiscal revenues (see Figure 3b).11
The present oil tax system  thus exposes PDVSA (after taxes) to a higher degree of risk
to oil prices than the government  (oil fiscal revenues). As oil prices rise, net profits per barrel
rise more than proportionally;  and as oil prices fall, after tax profits per barrel fall more than
proportionally. For example, in 1990  when oil prices (precio  paquete  de exportacion)  increased
by about 20% (and production  by 14%), this led to a 70% increase in PDVSA's net income (in
dollars) and to a 40% increase  in the government's  oil fiscal revenues (in dollars).
Figures 3a and 3b also shows  that total oil revenues  (exports  plus domestic  sales) are less
sensitive  to oil price changes than either the GOV's oil fiscal revenues or PDVSA's after tax
revenues per barrel.  This is because  the GOV's oil taxes are levied on gross profits (revenues
minus costs), where costs are kept constant at all price levels.
PDVSA's subsidiaries  abroad operate on what is called a "net back" basis. 9 That is,
PDVSA  guarantees  them a profit margin (as a percentage  of the profits) and the rest is absorbed
by PDVSA. Thus PVDSA  assumes  most of the oil price risk faced by the subsidiaries  with the
latter being exposed  only to changes in the profit margins. The subsidiaries  exposure  is through
the conversion  of the percentage  profit margin to the dollar (or other currency) profit margin.
(It is reported  that the subsidiaries  use hedging instruments  to cover  the exposure  associated  with
their profit margins.)
9PDVSA's subsidiaries  abroad are: in the United States, CITGO (100%) and UNO-VEN
(50%); and in Europe, AB NYNAS (50%) and RUHR OEL (50%).  All of these companies
operate refineries. In addition,  PDVSA has leased  the ISLA REFINERIA  refinery in Curacao
and operates storage facilities  in the Bahamas  (BAPROVEN)  and Antilles  (BONAIRE).12
In "Netback" schemes, the original supplier/producer  is essentially exposed to all the
transfer price "risk" while the buyers are insulated  against risks due to price volatility.  The
seller, therefore does not know the price he will eventually  receive.  In other pricing schemes
such  as "built-up"  or "add-on"  schemes,  the supplier/producer  is to some  extent insulated  against
"risk" between  the wellhead/port  and the point-of-consumption  because  these costs are added on
the production costs (either actual or expected), and thus reflected  in consumer  prices.'0
'°We owe the implications  of "netback" schemes  on price risk allocation to Mr. Mudassar
Imran.13
3.  VOLATILITY OF  CRUDE  OIL  AND PRODUCTS PRICES. BASIS RISK.  AND
LIQUIDITY
A.  Volatility of Crude Oil vis-a-vis Products
During the past 15 years PDVSA  has been  transformed  from an exporter of mainly  crude
oil to an exporter of mainly refined products. In 1976, out of a total production of 2.3 million
barrels per day,  PDVSA refined domestically  43.4% and exported about two-thirds of the
refined output.  The remaining 56.6% of production was exported  as crude oil.  In 1991, out
of a total production  of 2.5 million barrels per day, PDVSA refined domestically  43.1 % and
again exported  about two-thirds  of the refied  output. Of the remaining  production,  38.7% was
refined and sold abroad by PDVSA's subsidiaries. Thus only 18.2% of total production was
sold as crude oil.
One of the reasons given for PDVSA's shift to refined product exports was to achieve
a reduction  in the price volatility  faced by PDVSA. This would be so if product  prices are less
volatile  than crude oil prices and/or have a low correlation with oil prices.  However,  based on
the estimated  coefficients  of variation, the price volatility  of crude oil prices is not significantly
higher than the price volatility  of diesel and gasoline  for the period 1970-90  as well as the sub-
period 1980-9011  (see Table 1).
"The coefficients  of variation were calculated  on annual data.  Monthly data of product
prices tend to show  seasonality,  which  could raise the estimated  volatility. Seasonal  adjustments
would be necessary  if monthly data were used.14
Table 1:  Coefficients  of Variation for Crude Oil and Products (9M)
_________  _  1970-1990  1980-1990
Crude Oil  59.1  31.1
Gasoline  55.7  27.0
Diesel  55.4  28.0
Source:  International  Trade Division, The World Bank.
We also examined  the volatility  of refined products and crude oil using weekly  data for
the period 1988  to 1990. The volatility  was calculated  for the whole  period and for a sub-period
which excluded the 1990-91 Gulf War.  This was done because a number of analysts have
claimed that the volatility of products, and in particular  jet fuel, increased significantly  more
during the Gulf War than it did for crude oil. Table 2 shows that for both the total period and
for the subperiod,  crude oil volatility  was above product volatility  but not significantly  (except
for gasoline). This result holds whether we consider Gulf Coast/N.Y. or MARAVEN's prices
for the refined products (MARAVEN  is one of the three principal operating subsidiaries  of
PDVSA).
Table 2:  Volatility  of Crude Oil and Products  Prices: Weekly Data (%)
1988-90  1988-90  (excluding  the Gulf War)
Gasoline  14.64  10.79
Diesel  17.28  12.09
Diesel (MARAVEN)  16.43  13.03
Jet fuel  19.96  12.93
Jet fuel (MARAVEN)  19.39  14.02
Fuel oil  18.08  15.25
Fuel oil (MARAVEN)  17.50  13.84
Crude (Tia Juana)  20.81  15.06
Crude (Bonny  Light)  20.11  13.69
Source: International  Trade Division, The World Bank.
Notes:  Gasoline, regular unleaded gasoline (87), Gulf Coast; Diesel, Gulf Coast and
MARAVEN;  Jet Fuel, Gulf Coast and MARAVEN;  Fuel Oil, 2.2% sulfur, New
York and 2.8% sulfur, MARAVEN. Source of raw price data: Platt's.15
If prices of the products  are not closely  correlated  to the price of crude, then even if the
volatilities  between the products and crude are not significantly  different, the overall volatility
of PDVSA's export basket may drop.  To see this, let us view the measure of the overall
volatility  of PDVSA's export basket.  This is equal to:
Var(B) =  W? Var (P,) +  2  w  W5  COV(PjP,)
i-i  1.1  J-1
where  VAR ('r) is the variance  of the export basket, n is equal to the number  of refined  products
plus crude oil, Pi is the price of the ith product or crude oil, W, is the weight  (share) of the ith
product  or crude oil in the export basket and COV signifies  the covariance. As an illustration,
let us assume  that all variances  are equal, all covariances  (or correlations)  are zero and we have
five products (including  crude) with equal shares (0.2) in the export basket. It can easily  be seen
that then the volatility  of the overall export basket would  be 20% (or one fifth) of the volatility
of crude oil alone.  Thus, the covariances  play an important  role in the determination  of the
magnitude  of the volatility of the overall basket.
Table 3 shows  the correlation  coefficients  between major refined products  and crude oil
for the period 1981-1991. The correlations  are high enough (except for bunker) to make it
unlikely that the overall volatility of an export basket consisting  mainly of products, will be16
significantly lower than the volatility of an export basket consisting mainly of crude oil.' 2
Diversification  into refined products has led to the reduction of the overall volatility  of export
and tax revenues. However, this reduction  was not found to be statistically  significant. We also
calculated  the volatility  of the 1976 and 1991 export baskets of PDVSA, based on an estimate
of the weights  (shares) for each of the products  plus crude oil.  The volatility  of this basket  was
28.3% for the 1991 expon basket and 32.39%  for the 1976  export basket over the period 1981-
1991  (compared  to 31.1  % for crude oil only). This shows  that volatility  declined  somewhat  with
the diversification  of exports away from crude oil to products, but not significantly.
Table 3:  Correlation Between  Crude Oil and Products  (
1981-91
Crude oil  100.00
Residual  oil (low sulfur)  95.8





Source: International  Trade Division, The World Bank.
B.  Basis Risk
One important  reason why one may not want to use established  futures/options  markets
"2Using monthly data for the pe.riod  1988-90,  the correlation coefficients  were found to be
somewhat  lower, ranging from 75% to 85%.  But these correlations  using monthly  data are still
high enough not to expect a statistically significant reduction in the overall volatility of a
diversified  oil export basket compared to exporting crude only.17
for a commodity is the existence  of basis risk." 3 In the case of Venezuelan  crude oils, high
basis risk could be expected  because of the quality differential  between  Venezuelan  crudes and
West Texas Intermediate  (on which the futures contract in New York is based) and because a
price formula is used to set the prices of Venezuelan  crudes.
Table 4 shows the basis risk of some Latin American  crudes and Brent against West
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude for the period January 1986 to December 1990.  The ',','TI
crude was chosen as the standard of comparison  because the crude oil futures contract in New
York (NYMEX) is based on WTI. Alternatively,  Brent could have  been chosen as the London
(IPE) crude oil futures  contract is based on Brent.  The results show  that the Venezuelan  crudes
do have high basis risk.  Basis risk was also computed for different subperiods for Lagotreco
and Tia Juana Light (August 1988  to December 1990 and October 1988 to December 1990
respectively). These sub-periods  were selected  because prices showed  more responsiveness  to
world oil prices (as reflected  by WTI and Brent) for these periods than for the overall period.
During these subperiods,  the basis risk for both Lagotreco  and Tia Juana Light was significantly
reduced compared to that for the overall period.  However, even during these sub-periods,  the
basis risk was somewhat  high. 14
'3Basis risk refers to the divergence between the nmovements  (changes) in the price of a
commodity and the movements  (changes) in the price of underlying futures contract.  It is
measured  as 1-R 2 from the regression  of changes in the commodity  price on the changes in the
futures price (for that or another grade or commodity).
" 4Basis risk is considered to be high when it exceeds 15-20%.18
Table 4:  Basis Risk for Latin American Crudes and Brent. 1986-1990
Crude  Country  Basis Risk (%)
Istmo  Mexico  12
Oriente  Ecuador  22
Cano Limon  Colombia  15
Lagotreco  Venezuela  31
Lagotreco 1/  Venezuela  22
Tia Juana Light 2/  Venezuela  35
Tia Juana Light  Venezuela  27
Bachaquero  Venezuela  40
Brent  United Kingdom  11
I/  Regression  results for the sub-period  August 1988 to December 1990.
Z/  Regression  results for the sub-period  October 1988 to December 1990.
Source:  Claessens  and Varangis (1991).
The quality of Venezuelan  crudes is different from that of WTI and Brent crudes; this
difference  is due to the differences  in API gravity and sulfur content (see Table 5).  However,
the  qualities of  the Mexican, Colombian and Ecuadorian crudes are quite  similar to  the
Venezuelan  crudes.  Thus, if quality were the only difference, we would expect basis risk
Table 5:  Quality Characteristics  of Selected Crude Oils
________  API  %  Sulfur  Vanadium
Brent  38.2  0.3  0
WTI  39.0  0.4  0
Venezuela  (average)  28.4  1.5  +
Mexico (average)  27.4  2.4  +
Colombia (Cano Limon)  29.4  0.5  NA
Ecuador (Orito)  29.9  0.75  NA
Source: PDVSA, ECOPETROL.
Note:  Tia Juanna Light has 310 API, Bachaquero 170 API and Lagotreco 300 API, and
Lagotreco 300 API.19
for the Venezuelan  crudes to be close to that of the other Latin American crudes.  5 Even if
one considers Mexican  crudes to be of inferior quality to the Venezuelan  crudes, the argument
does not change.  If Mexican crude prices move closeby in line with the N.Y. oil futures
contract  prices then Venezuelan  crude prices should be expected to do at least the same based
on the quality argument  only. That is because Vei.ezuelan  crudes are of higher quality than the
Mexican  crudes and relatively closer in quality to WTI, the underlying  crude for the N.Y. oil
futures contract.
Another, more likely reason why Tia Juana Light and Lagotreco  have a relatively  high
basis risk is that Venezuelan  crudes are priced on the basis of formulae  that "smooth-out"  price
fluctuations. These formulae  use long-run moving  averages  of spot prices.  While the largest
part of the price-setting  formulae  is based on the Platt's, the "smoothing-out"  of short-term  price
fluctuation  can cause deviations  between Venezuela  and other crude prices over some periods.
Both the Ecuadorian  and the Venezuelan  crudes exhibited  higher basis risk than the Mexican  and
Colombia crudes.  Given that both Ecuador and Venezuela  were OPEC members during the
sample  period, the higher basis risk may also be due to the fact that their crude oil pricing was
affected  by OPEC pricing policies.
" 5The only exception  is Bachaquero  which is a very heavy crude (170  API) and we would
not expect WTI to be a good hedge for that crude.  Indeed, Khafji (Neutral Zone), a similar
although  lighter crude than Bachaquero,  was found to have high basis risk (26%) against  WTI.
See further Claessens and Varangis (1991).20
Even though the basis risk for the Venezuelan  crudes was found to be relatively  high,
it does not mean that there is no scope for hedging.  Even with a basis risk of 30%, the use of
futures contracts will reduce the volatility  associated  with oil prices by 70% (100-30%) over
short-run  periods (one to three months). For longer-term  hedges,  the reduction  in volatility  will
be somewhat  less, but no less than 62% (Claessens  and Varangis, 1991).
While basis iisk was not formally analyzed  for the refined products due to the lack of
data, an indication of the basis risk can be obtained from seeing how closely cash prices of
refined  product from Venezuela  and international  market prices for these products (as expressed
in the New York market)  move together. Regression  analysis  for monthly data for 1990  shows
that changes in the New York spot fuel oil price and the WTI crude price explain about 78%
and 67%, respectively, of the changes in MARAVEN's fuel oil prices.  For the same time
period, changes in the New York spot diesel price explain about 84% of the changes in
MARAVEN's  diesel oil prices.  Also, 82% of the changes  in MARAVEN's  gasoline  prices are
explained  by New York gasoline prices.
Doing  the same  regression  analysis  for gasoline,  but using weekly  data instead  of monthly
data, we find that the correlation between gasoline spot price changes in New York and in
MARAVEN  changes significantly. Using weekly data for 1989 and 1990, the changes in the
New York gasoline spot price explain less than 10% of MARAVEN's gasoline spot price
changes. If, instead, the New York gasoline spot price change lagged  one week is used, about
50% of MARAVEN's gasoline spot price changes  can be explained. With regards to fuel oil,21
using weekly data for 1989 and 1990, changes in New York's fuel oil prices explain only 4%
of MARAVEN's  changes  in fuel oil prices. However, if we include  the changes in N.Y. prices
lagged two weeks, New York fuel oil prices explain 61 % of the volatility in MARAVEN's
weekly fuel oil prices.  For diesel, we compared  MARAVEN's diesel prices with Gulf Coast
diesel prices.  Gulf Coast diesel price volatility explains 18% of MARAVEN's diesel price
volatility  and 45  % if we include  price changes  lagged  two weeks. For jet fuel, Gulf Coast price
movements  explain 15% of MARAVEN's prices and 45% if we include price changes lagged
two weeks.
Comparing  the weekly  with the monthly  results, the following  observations  can be made:
first, MARAVEN's product (gasoline, diesel, fuel oil, and jet fuel) prices do not respond to
market changes  (as reflected  by New York and Gulf Coast prices) oi  a week to week  basis but
when prices are aggregated  over a month they are closely related to New York and Gulf Coast
price movements. Second, the fact that the lagged New York and Gulf Coast product price
movements  influence  MARAVEN's product  price movements  more than current prices reflects
some inefficiencies  in the way MARAVEN  prices its products.  Observations  of the price data
reveal that MARAVEN  keeps its product  prices fixed for a long time, sometimes  for up to eight
to twelve weeks.1 6
16For  example, between the 4th and 12th week of 1989 MARAVEN's gasoline  price was
fixed at $20.06/bbl.  Meanwhile,  the New York gasoline price fluctuated  between $21.71/bbl
and $25.07/bbl. Similarly, in 1990, between the 20th and 32nd week  MARAVEN's price was
unchanged  at $26.15/bbl, with the New York gasoline  price fluctuating  between  $24.96/bbl and
$37.07/bbl.22
On balance, these findings  imply that, at least for fue' oil, diesel and gasoline,  basis risk
is likely to be small provided MARAVEN  removes some of the inefficiencies  in its current
pricing system.  That is,  MARAVEN's product prices should be allowed to become more
responsive  to product prices in the international  markets. However, this judgement should be
supporteu  by a formal  analysis  of the basis risk involving  futuMa  price data for heating  oil, Wll,
and gasoline instead  of New York spot prices, and doing the analysis  over a longer time period.
Heating oil futures contracts  are typically  used to hedge  diesel and (in combination  with gasoline
futures contracts) some "cracxed" fuel oil prices.  For hedging "uncracked"  fuel oil, the WTI
or Brent crude oil futures contracts are usually  used.' 7
C.  Liquidity
Currently, the  futures/options market for crude oil  is the most liquid amongst all
commodity  markets. More crude oil is traded daily on the NYMEX (the light, sweet crude oil
futures contract  based on the WTI crude) than the total world production  of crude oil (about 65-
80 million barrels in futures versus 60 million barrels of physical). 1 8 Options on NYMEX's
oil  futures contracts account for about 25-30 million barrels or  half of  world crude oil
production.  In addition, Brent crude oil futures contracts traded at IPE have a daily trading
volume of about 40-50 million barrels, and options on these contracts account for 5-7 million
"A more appropriate  crude oil contract to hedge fuel oil could be the sour crude contract.
However, NYMEX's and SIMEX's sour crude contracts  do not yet have adequate liquidity.
'Liquidity has expanded  rapidly.  In 1989 and 1990, the average daily NYMEX  crude oil
futures contract trading volume was 55 million barrels and 63.4 million barrels respectively,
compared to 22 million barrels in 1986.23
barrels in daily trades.  Thus, in New York and London, roughly twice the world's physical
crude oil daily production is traded in futures and about one-half in options.' 9
The daily futures trading volume of heating oil (used to hedge diesel, jet fuel and fuel
oil) is currently about 1 billion gallons; and there is about 50 million gallons of trades in
options. Gasoline's  daily futures and options  trading volumes  on NYMEX  are some 800  million
gallons and 150  million  gallons, respectively. Since 1988, daily trading volumes  in futures and
options for heating oil have increased by over 50% and they have more than doubled for
gasoline.
Measured  in terms of open interest (the number of futures/options  contracts outstanding
at any moment), most of the liquidity  on the NYMEX is concentrated  in the short-run. While
as of March 1993  the maturities  of crude oil futures contracts extend beyond December 1995,
the most liquidly-traded  contracts are concentrated  in the nearest nine to ten months. That is,
about 75  % of the open interest is concentrated  in the first nine months. For Brent crude, most
(up to 90%) of the open interest is concentrated  in the first four to five months. The same holds
true for NYMEX's heating  oil and gasoline  futures contracts  (78% and 90% of the open interest,
respectively). In options, most of the interest is also concentrated  in short-term  maturities.
19We  do not count  two other crude oil contracts,  NYMEX's sour crude and SIMEX's Dubai,
as they are not very liquid at present.24
An additional source of market liquidity can be the over-the-counter  market (OCM).
This market includes options and swaps and covers periods longer than those covered by the
futures/options  traded at the exchanges. For example, it is not uncommon  to be able to enter
an oil price swap extending  to seven or even ten years.  Because  the OCM market is relatively
new and because  it is not as tightly monitored  as the exchanges,  we do not have good evidence
of the degree of liquidity. However, there are indications  that this market is growing rapidly.
Several  developing  countries  have used the OCM  oil market in recent years for hedging
purposes. During the Gulf War, the OCM was used by Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, mainly for
short-dated  swaps and options.
Sumiarizing, the following  can be said regarding liquidity:
(i)  For short-term hedges, say up to six-nine months, the existing futures/options
contracts  provide  considerable  liquidity. Of course, on a single day or even over
the course of one week, there is not enough liquidity  to cover all of Venezuela's
exports for six months (roughly  380 million  barrels); but nobody would  advocate
Venezuela  placing such a hedge over such a short period of time.  During the
Gulf War, Mexico hedged six month's worth of exports, roughly 250 million
barrels, and did so by spreading  the sale and purchase  of futures, options, OCM
options  and short-dated  swaps  over a period of two  months. Placing  large hedges
gradually overcomes any liquidity problem, and because doing so  "locks-in"
prices over several trading days rather than on a single trading day, it achieves
a smoother  price path.25
(ii)  For  longer-term hedges, i.e.,  more than a year, the use of exchange-traded
futures/options  contracts  can only provide very limited  coverage. Currentiy, all
the open interest in crude oil futures contracts  of more than a year is about equal
to two month's of Venezuela's oil exports.  For refined products, longer-term
futures/options  hedges can provide even less coverage. But, liquidity  for longer-
term hedges can be enhanced  by using the OCM. The liquidity  of the OCM can
be assessed  by  approaching  various brokerage  firms or banks. It should  be noted
that in the case of longer-term  hedges, the access and terms of using the OCM
will depend on  the  perception in  international financial markets regarding
Venezuela's creditworthiness.
(iii)  There are few instances where hedging all the commodity price exposure is
advisable. In most cases, partial hedges covering a faction of the exposure are
carried out.  The fraction of the exposure covered is determined  by an analysis
of the existing market circumstances,  the amount of risk that is acceptable, the
cost of hedging,  the possible  offset  between  price and quantity  fluctuations  as well
as other circumstances  specific  to the company's or the government's interest.26
4.  OIL STABILIZATION  FUND
A.  Conditions for the Establishment of a Government Oil Stabilization Fund
From an analytical  point  of view, there are certain conditions  and empirical  relationships
that are required to hold in order to make the establishment  of an oil stabilization  fund (OSF)
economically  and financially  attractive.20 The following  five are necessary conditions which
need to hold jointly:
1.  Hedging against oil  price  instability by  transferring risk  abroad is  impossible or
suboptimal. The reasons can be incomplete  international  financial  markets (in futures,
options, and oil-linked  loans  and bonds and other (OTC)  instruments  to insure against  oil
price variability), or (domestic)  restrictions  on the ability of companies  and individuals
to access international  financial  markets.
2.  Access  to international  credit markets is imperfect  for creditworthiness  reasons. A pro-
cyclical  foreign  lending  pattern may exist which  reduces  available  lending  to sub-optimal
levels, possibly to zero, during periods of low oil price.
3.  The government's objective function includes intertemporal government expenditure
smoothing, i.e., the government  attempts to save revenue perceived as transitory while
spending  revenue anticipated  as permanent.
20This  section  draws on notes by Schmidt-Hebbel  (1992).27
4.  The private sector cannot or is not able to offset (completely)  any changes in the level
and variability  of the government's  consumption  or saving  through its own consumption
or saving.
5.  1  he government's  main revenue uncertainty  stems from oil price instability.
However, these conditions  are not sufficient. In addition, establishing  an OSF requires
either:
6.  oil  prices do  not follow a  random walk or  other martingale process.  Prices are
stationary, allowing the government to distinguish between transitory and permanent
shocks; or,
7.  The government's objective function includes adjustment (or political-economy)  costs
when adjusting  spending. As a result, the government  will prefer to avoid changing  or
scaling back programs in order to minimize macroeconomic  or sectoral disruptions  or
alienation  of constituencies  and voters.
Do these conditions  hold in V -.Luela? Conditions 1-3 are typically mentioned  when
justifying the establishment  of an OSF for Venezuela.  Conditions 2 and 3 are reasonably28
realistic conditions for  Venezuela, but condition 1 is  questionable. 21 For  short-term oil
hedging, it has been shown in Section  3 that the market is available  and suitable  for Venezuela.
Margin requirements assure that credit risk is not an issue, and,  in principle, make these
instruments  available  to Venezuela  at very low cost. We have shown  above that oil futures can
remove up to 85 % of the oil price risk for horizons of one to two months ahead and up to 81  %
for somewhat longer horizons.  Because these hedging instruments have short maturities,
however, they provide less hedging value over longer periods--even  with rolling over of the
hedges. 22 Use of longer-dated  instruments  would  thus be desirable. The market for longer-
term commodity hedging instruments, i.e.,  oil swaps and oil-linked loans and bonds, has
develop,.d  quite rapidly in recent years.  Longer-term  hedging instruments  involve  credit risk,
however, and may thus be incompletely  available to Venezuela (as its access to international
credit markets is imperfect)  or at less attractive  terms.  Nevertheless,  some long- term hedging
should be possible.
Condition  4 in part arises from the imperfect  access of private corporations  and citizens
in Venezuela  to foreign finance  (due to creditworthiness),  preventing  them from offsetting  public
savings and expenditure decisions (even though the occurrence of capital flight needs to be
2 "With regards to condition  3, Deaton  (1992)  argues that cases where commodity  booms  or
slumps are obviously temporary  are far from typical.  Alss, shocks that could or should have
been considered as temporary, as in the late 1970s for coffee and cocoa, were perceived as
rather permanent  by many analysts and producing  countries.
'The  problem with rolling-over  coverage  based on short-term maturing instruments  is that
this usually implies  a large exposure  in these instruments. This can imply  the possibility  of large
margin calls and/or large option premiums, as well as large exposures  to basis risks, making the
instruments  less attractive  for foreign exchange  constrained  countries.29
considered here too).23 In addition, imperfect  domestic financial  markets (such as the lack of
a long-term bond market) may contribute  to the inability of the private sector to offset public
actions.
As was shown above, condition 5 (oil price volatility  being the largest source of GOV
revenue variability) is a realistic assumption  for Venezuela.  Moreover, the government  has
taken most of the oil price risks (looking  forward, this will change somewhat  as a result of the
new tax formula which will pass more risk to PDVSA).
1. is difficult to argue that condition 6 or 7 holds.  It has proved difficult to reject the
random-walk hypothesis assumed by  condition 6  for  most oil  prices  (and  many  other
commodities)--at  least in the short-term. 4 Tests of the main Venezuelan  oil price, Tia Juana
Light (310),  confirm that non-stationarity  in levels cannot be rejected.'  Even where the pure
random-walk  hypothesis  is rejected, the evidence  suggests  that the commodity-price  time series
23There  is a high correlation  between  the oil price and the level of capital  flight, R 2 = 0.67.
Higher oil prices allowed  more capital  flight and was the rational savings  response  of the private
sector to the lack of savings  by the public sector.
24See  further Arrau and Claessens  (1992)  for copper and oil prices, Basch and Engel (1992)
for copper prices,  Morales (1992)  for tin prices, and Hausmann  et al. (1992) for Venezuelan
oil revenues. The random walk hypothesis  is consistent  with efficient  arbitrage in financial  and
commodity  markets when rational expectations  prevail.
2sAugmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF) tests with 1, 4 and 52 lags, and using a constant or a
constant and a  time trend  applied to  weekly data (4/1983-7/1991), indicate rejection of
stationarity  for the nominal  price level (the ADF-test  with 4 lags and a constant  and a time trend
can only be rejected at the 10% level).  Over longer periods and using monthly data (e.g.,
1/1970 - 6/1989), price stationarity  can also be rejected (both with a constant and a time trend
and with a constant only).30
process  is  not  quickly mean reverting. 26 Deaton and  Laroque (1992) show that  most
commodity prices do revert eventually to their mean, but only very slowly, with an average
reversal time measured in years, not months.  Arrau and Claessens (1992) even find positive
autocorrelation  in the first differences  of monthly  oil prices, indicating  no mean reversion  in the
short run, but instead the opposite. On balance, there is thus no convincing  evidence that oil
prices display  the quick mean-reverting  behavior  required to make use of an OSF rational.
If the GOV bears  some  adjustment  or other  costs when changing  its expenditure  programs
(condition  7), an OSF could be useful in smoothing  government  expenditures. This motivation
underlics  the recommendations  made by Hausmann  et al. (1991, 1993),  and also those  by Basch
and Engel (1992).27  In general, these are more politically-oriented  explanations  and have less
appeal from an economic  point of view.
Finally, an OSF has often  been  justified  on the grounds  that such a fund provides  positive
externalities, such as an increase in overall confidence,  which  justifies keeping a large amount
of low-yielding  foreign  assets even when  the country  is credit-constrained.  Part of this improved
26Williams  and Wright (1991), Deaton and Laroque (1992), and Trivedi (1991) reject the
random walk as they find that there is more linear and nonlinear dependence in the first
difference  of most commodity  prices than is consistent  with the random  walk hypothesis. Part
of this behavior  can be explained  by the competitive  storage model, which indicates  that price
jumps due to "stock-outs"  lead to skewed price distributions  and nonlinear, serial dependence.
27An OSF could be also motivated by other benefits including reduction in: (a) public
pressures  to quickly spend revenues increases,  (b) spending  which  takes on a life of its own and
cannot  be reversed, and (c) spending  which  is inefficient. These considerations  may make sense
in some institutional  contexts  but should  not be taken as a generally  valid feature of GOV  policy.31
confidence could come from stabilization  of the real exchange rate, which may benefit other
sectors of the economy when there  are costs of adjustment (see also Gilbert,  1992, and
Cuddington, 1989).  However, these adjustment  costs alone cannot be a sufficient reason to
establish an OSF  when the  private sector can  hedge against these changes itself.  This
justification thus relies on  the  lack of  access of  the  private sector to  external hedging
instruments, something which cannot be taken for granted (as the existence of capital flight
shows), or can be due to imperfectly  functioning  domestic  financial  markets, something  which
requires policy changes directed at improving  these markets.
B.  Policy  ImDlications
This section  develops  the implications  of various policy options GOV has in coping  with
oil price uncertainty. It assumes, for the purposes of argument, that the main concem of the
GOV is that variability  in expenditures  leads to real exchange rate and output variability; and
that the GOV has an advantage  over the private sector in hedging against oil price risks. The
following  implications  are then derived.
o  Diversification. Intemational  risk diversification  should  be encouraged. To some  extent
this can be done through production  and  export diversification in the oil sector.
However, the benefits from doing  this are limited for a number of reasons; 1) other oil
sector activities, e.g.,  moving down stream, have a positive correladon between net
profits and the oil price; 2) activity  diversification  takes a long time to achieve; and 3)
establishment  of new activities can be counter to Venezuela's long-run comparative32
advantage. 28 The first-best  policy is to allow and encourage  oil risk hedging operations
in  international financial markets. 29 Short-term, market-based, commodity risk
management  instruments--futures  and  options--are  the best  possibility  here, complemented
with longrr-term hedging  tools to the extent available  to Venezuela.
o  Oil Stabilization Fund.  The effectiveness of  an OSF requires a  large  number of
conditions  to hold simultaneously. As discussed  above, it is not very likely that this is
the case.  As a second best solution, an OSF may still be pursued, however.  Any OSF
will still provide some smoothing  benefits,  even though not necessarily  in the most cost-
effective  way, especially  when compared  to market-based  hedging  techniques.
28It is sometimes  argued  that, to cope with export price instability,  economic  diversification
should  be encouraged  by taxing  existing  commodity  production  or exports and subsidizing  other,
more stable, production or export sectors.  This is a faulty policy prescription, leading to an
inefficient  resource allocation (Hausmann  VW.  1993). Once  commodity  risk management  has
been put in place to deal with oil revenue risk, and oil project evaluation has considered the
riskiness of expected returns, no additional policies need to be put into place to  achieve
economic  diversification.
29 This is a corollary of the finding  that the benefits from portfolio diversification  and risk
sharing may dominate the gains from accessing foreign saving when the capital account is
opened  i  anson,;  2).33
C.  Optimal Spending  Rules and the Design of an Oil Stabilization  Fund
In principle,  government  spending  should  be determined  on the basis of economic
efficiency  criteria.  Investment  as well as transfer payment  decision should  be derived from an
analysis of expected  future costs and benefits and using appropriate  discounting  methods. This
implies that spending  rules should, to some extent, be independent  of the behavior of  fiscal
revenues over time.  Only to the extent that a permanent change in future expected revenue
occurs, shou!d  (projected)  spending  be adjusted.
Taking this approach  will in itself already imply  a significant  reduction in overall macro-
instabili., as the government  will reduce the variability units spending.  Any variability in
revenues over time is then simply saved (or dissaved).
An OSF can aid in this process by separating  the spending  decisions  more formally  from
fiscal revenues.  If the GOV were to decide to move forward with an OSF, in spite of the
arguments  made earlier against the economic  and financial  soundness  of such a decision, then
ideally the OSF should feature three properties:
*  Accumulation  of reserves should be based on a forward-lgokin  revenue (or
price) projection, rather  than a  backward-looking  revenue (or  price) rule.
Backward-looking  price schemes  have seldom  worked in practice because of the
long time it takes for commodity  prices to return to their long-run equilibrium.
Long before prices revert to their mean, the fund will either have run out of
money  or have  accumulated  large amounts  of reserves  (which  will lead to political34
pressures to spend them).  The best forward-looking  prices available are the
prices set in the futures and other oil-derivative  markets.  They are efficient
predictors of future spot prices (see Kaminsky  and Kumar (1990)). Currently,
futures go out about three years, but by supplementing  them with the forward
prices implicit  in oil swaps, market forecasts  up to ten years can be derived. The
GOV should therefore use these implicit long-run price forecasts in setting the
withdrawal  and savings rules for the fund (as well as in setting  parameters in its
annual budget exercise).
*  The design of an OSF should  be directly related to the stochastic  behavior  of oil
revenues and GOV objectives.  This implies that the size of the fund should
depend on: a) the stochastic  properties of uncertain revenues or oil prices or the
magnitude  of the adjustment  costs paid by the GOV when changing or down-
scaling its spending  programs; and b) the degree of intertemporal  smoothing  the
GOV wants to attain.
*  The rules should operate on the stock of reserves in the OSF, and not on the
annual accumulation  of reserves.  Consequently,  the rules should be defined in
terms of an optimal  stock  level (given  prize expectations)  and annual deposits  and
withdrawals  will follow from that optimal stock level.35
There have been several papers written in  recent years on  the  optimal design of
commodity stabilization funds (CSFs), each of them consistent with  the three  properties
mentioned  above.  The best summary  on the design of CSFs is probably Deaton (1992) who
argues that, because comnmodity  prices exhibit only slow mean-reversion,  either a CSF would
have to be irrationally  large to be effective  in smoothing  revenues or the country  would need to
have ample access to foreign borrowing opportunities. A large CSF is for domestic political
reasons not feasible--it  is too much subject  to spending  pressure from domestic  constituencies--
and sovereign  risk prohibits the necessary  access to foreign  borrowing.  As a small CSF is not
effective, Deaton argues that there is  little scope for countries to  stabilize their domestic
consumption  levels through  a CSF or through borrowing in the international  capital markets. 3
In the next section we investigate an example of a simple OSF complemented  with
market-based  hedging instruments. The OSF used for the simulations  does not have the ideal
properties described here, but it still could be instrumental  in achieving  more macroeconomic
stability. As a second  best solution,  such an opinion--comple.menting  an OSF with market-based
hedging inscrument--may  be worth pursuing  by the Government  of Venezuela.
300ther studies on this subject are as follows:  Hausmann and Powell (1992) assume a
random  walk process for oil prices (which  would  imply that no fimd  would  be necessary  as price
would not revert to a mean).  However, they justify the creation of a fund on adjustment  costs
in the economy. A more stable real exchange rate would  prevent these adjustment  costs. The
fund would have to be large, however, to reduce the exchange rate volatility  over an extended
period. Basch  and Engel (1991)  combine  the predictions  of a large-scale  copper model  with the
policy functions  derised by Deaton (1991) in his optimal model for the case when income is
assumed  stationary.  They  thus  introduce  an  inconsistency in  that  they  derive  the
saving/withdrawal  policy functions independent  of the price process.  Arrau and Claessens
(1992) estimate the oil price process and use the Deaton 1991 model to determine  the optimal
saving rules consistent  with the estimated  price process.36
E.  Complementing  an OSF with Market-Based  Hedging
To the extent that an OSF or general revenue stabilization  fund is desired, it can be
usefully complemented  by market-based risk management  tools.  One possibility is to  use
market-based  instruments such as options to hedge against the occurrence of price spikes or
sharp drops.  Given the presence of fat tails in the oil price distribution  (see Figure 4) it may
be efficient  to hedge  using market-based  instruments  (especially  instruments  designed  to remove
the effects  of spikes, such as options)  instead  of holding low-yielding  assets in reserves. To the
extent  desired, the OSF could be used to manage  any remaining  interperiod  risk or more general
government  revenues risk.
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Flgure 4: Price Histogram:  1983-199137
We evaluated such a strategy for the 1987-1991  period (see also Larson and Coleman
(1991)  who use this methodology  for agricultural  commodities). The strategy simulated  was as
follows: in early 1987, the GOV buys a series  of put options with strike prices set at an oil price
of $20 and expiring over the next five months. The GOV also sells call options  at strike prices
of $24 for the next five months, provided calls with a strike price of $24/barrel are traded
(during most of this period they were not traaed).  Once the "collar" is in place, GOV rolls
forward the hedge every day by buying the next day's five-month  maturity $20 put and selling
the next day's five-month  maturity $24 call (if available). Consequently,  the GOV will always
have covered the next five months of its exports with a lower bound, which is financed  by
selling  an upper bound. Figure 5 shows  the bands and the periods when the put and call options
were exercised.
Depending  on movements  in the spot price during the period the option hedge  is in place,
GOV will either exercise  the put options  at the various  maturity dates, or be required to provide
the necessary  funds when the calls are exercised, or do nothing  when the price remains within
the band of $20 to $24. We simulated  this option strategy  until  just before the Gulf war, August
1990--implying  that the GOV would have bought  the last option on March 1, 1990, five months
before.
We use daily option prices obtained  from NYMEX  (settlement  prices), eliminating  those
for which the outstanding  interest (number  of contracts  bought or sold) is zero (when no prices
are available  for the exercise  prices of interest, $20 and $24, we estimate the options  premiums38
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using Black's model, the futures prices on that date, and the estimate of the volatility of oil
prices implied  by the option premiums  on contracts which are quoLed  on that day). We use the
spot WTI-price  obtained from DRI on a weekly basis. 3'  For the period 1/1/87 - 7/31/90 the
results are as follows:  buying daily over the period 1/1/87 - 3/1/90 the five-month-out  $20 put
option costs on average  $2.07/barrel. Only a limited  amount  of $24 calls were available, which
cost on average $0.26/barrel.  Over the period 1/1/87 - 8/1/90 the put options were exercised
3 "As shown  earlier, the WTI price correlates  closely  with the Venezuelan  spot price in recent
periods.  However, before 1989 the Tia Juana price did not follow WTI as closely (see Figure
5).39
by GOV during the periods of low oil prices, resulting  in price protection  equal on average to
$1.77/barrel.  The cost of exercising  the call options  was very limited, only $0.03/barrel.  On
net the strategy resulted in a $0.04/barrel gain.  Individual  year results are shown in Table 6.
Since the WTI price behaved differently over this period from the Tia Juana price--the
Tia Juana priced was fixed for several periods--we also simulated  the same hedging strategy
using the Tia Juana price (see Table 7).  Since in more recent times the Tia Juana price has
followed  the WTI price closely, and can be expected to continue  to do so, the WTI results are
more relevant.
The results for the Tia Juana  price may appear  to be better. This is ir, part due, however,
to the fact that Tia Juana trades on average  about $0.92/barrel below WTI.  As a result the put
options were more beneficial, leading to an overall gain of $0.6/barrel.  This is misleading,
however, since the options are exercisable  on the WTI-price, and on not the Tia Juana prices.
Consequently,  the cash gains would not have been realized to the extent indicated  here.  Table
6 is thus the more relevant  comparison.
The results depend heavily on whether or not the Gulf war period is included.  If we
extend the hedging period from 1/1/87 through 2/1/91, the net result is a loss of $0.98/barrel
for WTI and $0.34/barrel for Tia Juana (the results are in the last row of the Tables). The put
option still provides  a net gain, but the call strategy  results in a loss as the calls sold before the
Gulf war were exercised at a high price.40
Table 6: Option Strategy:  WTI-price
(dollars per barrel)
Put:  Put:  Call:  Call:  Net
Costs  Gains  Sales  Costs
1987  $1.183  $0.978  $0.250  $0.000  $0.05
1988  $2.970  $4.055  $0.049  $0.000  $1.13
1989  $1.785  $0.610  $0.100  $0.000  $-1.18
1990 (whole year)  $0.978  $0.668  $1.708  $3.029  $-1.63
1991 (until March)  $2.572  $0.386  $1.224  $0.382  $-1.34
All Years: Excluding  Gulf  $2.068  $1.771  $0.260  $0.003  $0.040
War
All  Years: Including  Gulf  $1.917  $1.542  $0.218  $0.821  $-0.978
War
Table 7: Option Strategy:  Tia Juana Price
(dollars per barrel)
Put:  Put:  Call:  Call:  Net
Costs  Gains  Sales  Costs
1987  $1.183  $2.294  $0.250  $0.000  $1.36
1988  $2.970  $3.222  $0.049  $0.000  $0.973
1989  $1.785  $1.647  $0.100  $0.001  $-0.04
1990 (whole year)  $0.978  $1.568  $1.708  $2.573  $-0.28
1991 (until March)  $2.572  $0.9245  $1.224  $1.260  $-1.68
All Years: Excluding  Gulf  $2.068  $2.440  $0.260  $0.025  $0.607
War
All Years:  Including  Gulf  $1  .917  $2.118  $0.218  $0.758  $-0.339
War41
We also simulated other optic i strategies, including  one in which a band around the
futures prices for the six-month  ahead period was created (the band thus varied over time). The
results were similar.
F.  Complementaritv  Between  the Fund and Options Strategy
The simulations have shown that options can be useful in stabilizing Venezuelan  oil
prices.  The options are effective in removing the impact of sharp price drops at the cost of
slightly  lower revenues  at times when prices rise sharply. The net upfront financing  costs of this
particular options' strategy was about $1.81 per barrel ($2.060 for the puts minus $0.260 for
the calls).  This compares to an average overall gain of about $0.38 per barrel (for the WTI-
hedge, Table 6).  As the length of the hedge horizon was five months, the rate of return on the
upfront financing  was on average  high, 4.4% ($0.04/$181  x 2) which compares  favorable  to the
possi' le retunrI  on holding assets in an OSF (presumably  the risk-free rate of return).
The complementarity  between an OSF and an options strategy can be further illustrated
by investigating  what would happen if a fund were implemented  and operated under a set of
rules, and this fund were combined with an options strategy. Since we have not analyzed  the
optimal rules for an OSF for Venezuela, we build for this exercise some simple rules for an
OSF. The exact rules we use are set out in Table 8.  These rules were inspired  and are similar,
but not quite, to those used by Oman (see Annex  I).  The major differences  between the rules
used in this paper and Oman's rules are that the Oman fund does not stipulate  the rules for42
withdrawals and the rules for fund accumulation  during certain oil prices (above $22 per
barrel). 32
Table 8: Rules of the Fund
Prices  Withdrawal  (%)  Deposit  (%)
P<  $10  50  i
$10  <P  < $12  25
$12<P<$14  10
$14  <P  < $16  7.5
$16  <P  <  $18  0
$18 <P  <$20  7.5
$20  <P  < $22  10
$522  <P  <$25  _  25
$25  <P  50
Note that these rules are ad-hoc, and certainly  not consistent  with the requirements  for
the optimal rules outlined  above.  Using these rules now for the period 1987-1991  leads to a
slightly more stabilized  price (see Figure 6). The standard  deviation  of the price with the fund
only is 3.55,  somewhat  less then the standard deviation of TJLIGHT without a fund (4.53).
However, including  the options strategy (the fund is then only in operation in the $20 to $24
price band) leads to an even more stable price with the standard deviation only 1.26.  The
options strategy allows  Venezuela  to do away  with much of the required withdrawals  from and
deposits  in the fund.  This can also be seen from Figure 7 which plots the (weekly)  deposits
32Because  of these differences,  it is hard to compare  our simulations  with the actual working
of the Oman fund.43
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Figure 8: Fund with and without  options, dolla  per barrel.
which are much less with a fund when the options hegding strategy is used. In exchange, of
course, the options strategy required that Venezuela  pays for puts, but as we showed above,
these puts are to some extent financed  by calls.
The main advantage  of combining  the OSF with an options strategy is that it avoids  the
large rundowns  and accumulations  of an OSF.  Figure 8 shows  the size of the fund under a OSF
only and under a combined OSF/options  strategy (expressed  in dollars per barrel).  As can be
seen, the fund is much more stable under the combined strategy than under the fund-only
strategy.  Excluding  the period of the Gulf War, the fund under the combined strategy varies46
only between  $0 and $0.05 per barrel exported  (with  a standard  deviation  of 0.018), while using
the fund-only  strategy leads to a consistently  negative fund, which reaches a lowest value of -
$0.28 cents (with a standard deviation  of 0.069).  Thus, under the combined strategy the fund
takes on much less extreme values.  This is particularly  clear once we include the Gulf War
period. The standard  deviation  for the fund without  the options strategy  increases  to 0.58, while
with the options strategy the fund has only a standard deviation  of 0.03.  This shows that the
combined strategy has appeal from an economic  point of view.  Whenever  the fund reached a
large negative values it would require large borrowings which is presently not feasible for
Venezuela. From a political  point of view, there are some advantages  to a combined strategy
too.  The option strategy involves using the discipline of  international markets to  reduce
volatility  and is thus better shielded from political  pressures  than a (large) fund kept under the
control of the government. Whenever  the fund reached large positive values, there would be
strong political  pressures to divert the fund to other expenditures.
5.  WHO SHOULD  HEDGE?
There really is no clear-cut answer to the question of whether the GOV or PDVSA
should  hedge. Who should  hedge depends  on the specific  country and company  circumstances.
Usually, when it comes to hedging, the entity in the best position  to carry out the hedges is the
one that handles the physical trade.  In the case of Venezuela  this is PDVSA.  The entity that
handles the physical trade has better information  regarding production, dates of shipping the
exports, long-term plans for exports, and developments in the world oil market.  There is
already an infrastructure in place that follows developments  in the world oil markets, makes
analyses and projections  and runs the physical operations. In addition, it is our understanding47
that in the case of Venezuela, PDVSA can  implement  a  hedging program without forma
approval  from the Congress.  On the other hand, if the government  was to implc'nont such a
program, it would  need specific  approval  from the Congress. However, if PDVSA  is to execute
the hedges, the government needs to be involved in the design of the hedging strategy to be
pursued.  Ideally, a committee  should be formed, consisting  of staff from different ministries
(such as planning  and finance), the Central Bank and PDVSA  that would meet periodically  to
review  the  performance of  the  existing hedging  strategy  and,  if  ncessary,  propose
modifications. The day-to-day  execution  of hedges would fall to PDVSA.
However, it  is  not uncommon to  find a  government ministry or  a  cental  bank
implementing  a risk management  program and executing  hedges.  During the Gulf War, the
Ministries  of Finance and the Central Banks  in Chile, El Salvador,  and Mexico  executed  the oil
risk hedging.  More recently, the Central Bank of Ecuador is reportedly hedging  the crude oil
price risk affecting the govermnent's revenues.48
6.  CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis has shown that both the GOV and PDVSA are exposed to  oil price
volatility. Oil price volatility  is responsible  for a large part of the volatility  of GOV's total (oil
and non-oil) revenues.  Under the current oil tax system, PDVSA's exposure increases  as oil
prices fall.
Comparisons  of price volatility  esdmates  show  that crude oil price volatility  is higher than
refined  product price volatility,  but not by much.  Also, as product  prices are closely  correlated
with crude oil prices, diversification  into down-steam  activides provides little risk reduction.
Regarding  the issue of basis risk, Venezuelan  crude oils have a relatively  high basis risk vis-a-
vis WTI as compared  to other, similar quality Latin  American  crudes. This relatively  high basis
risk is mainly attributed to the pricing policies for Venezuelan  crudes.  While a thorough
evaluation  of the basis risk in refined products was not pursued, preliminary  analysis indicates
that it is not high.  To the extent basis risk exists, it may be due to Venezuela's inefficiencies
in pricing these products.
The analysis  raises concerns regarding  the establishment  of an OSF.  It was argued that
international  financial  markets are not as incomplete  as perceived. In addition, the random  walk
hypothesis  for oil prices cannot be easily challenged  based on recent empirical work.  Finally,
adjustment  costs deriving from price/revenue instability  cannot alone be a sufficient  reason to
establish  an OSF when the private sector can hedge. A jusdfication  based on adjustment  costs
relies on the lack of access of the private sector to external hedging instruments, something
which cannot  be taken for granted as the existence  of capital flight shows.49
As a short-term  hedging  tool, market-basod  instuments  perform  equally  well or better
than an OSF in removing  short-period  volatility,  and at lower costs.  The best strtegy for
Venezuela  to follow  is to remove  as much  short-period  commodity  price  risk  as possible  through
short-dated  instruments  as well  as--to  the extent  possible--using  longer-term  hedging  tools. The
analysis also shows that an OSP or  a  government  revenue stabilizadon  hnd  could be
complemented  by market-baed  risk  management  tools. The OSF  could  then  be used  to manage
any remaining  interperiod  risk or more  general  government  revenue  risk. It should  be noted,
however,  that  the use  of market-based  hedging  instruments  will  not necessarly  render  the OSF
immortal;  but it should  generate  benefits  to the  government  by extending  the probable  life  of the
OSF  (Larson  and Coleman,  1991).50
ANNEX I:  THE OMAN CONTINGENCY FUND
The Oman Contingency  Fund (OCF) operates under the following  rules:
*  If oil prices range between $18 and $20 per barrel, 7.5% of net oil revenues will
be deposited  in the fund.
*  If oil prices range between $20 and $22 per barrel, 10% of the additional  net oil
revenues will be deposited.
*  If oil prices are above $22 per barrel, additional deposits (unspecified)  will be
required.
*  If  oil  prices are  above $25 per  barrel,  all  additional oil  revenues will be
transferred to the State General Reserve Fund.
*  Withdrawals  of the two funds are unspecified  with respect to the oil prices, but
are  determined (up  to  a  limit)  by  the  government for  deficit financing.
Furthermore, withdrawals  are subject to approval  by the Council of Ministers.51
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